El cable cita un pedido de reunión hecho por el Canciller Fander Falconí a la Embajadora Heather Hodges para hablar sobre las relaciones entre Ecuador y Colombia.
id:
219977
date:
8/7/2009 15:53
refid:
09QUITO704
origin:
Embassy Quito
classification:
CONFIDENTIAL
destination:
header:
VZCZCXYZ0352
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DE RUEHQT #0704/01 2191553
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 071553Z AUG 09
FM AMEMBASSY QUITO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0728
INFO RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 8298
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 4240
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 3666
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RUEHGL/AMCONSUL GUAYAQUIL 4537
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC
RHMFISS/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
RHEFHLC/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
----------------- header ends ----------------
C O N F I D E N T I A L QUITO 000704
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: TWENTY YEARS
TAGS: PREL, MARR, SNAR, EC, CO
SUBJECT: FM FALCONI ON ECUADOR-COLOMBIA RELATIONS, US BASE
ACCESS IN COLOMBIA.
Classified By: Ambassador Heather M. Hodges for Reasons 1.4 (b&d)
1. (C) At Foreign Minister Fander Falconi's request, the
Ambassador met with Falconi the morning of August 5 to
discuss Ecuador-Colombia relations. Also in the meeting for
the Foreign Ministry were Under Secretary for Bilateral
Affairs, Jorge Orbe, and North American Affairs officer
Cristina Camacho. DCM accompanied the Ambassador.
2. (C) Although Falconi began the meeting inquiring after the
status of the U.S. delegation to Correa's inauguration on
August 10, his major agenda item was Colombia. He reviewed
the historically good relations Ecuador has maintained with
Colombia, despite the decades long conflict within Colombia
which has negatively affected Ecuador with spillover across
the border. Falconi stressed that Ecuador's position has
always been one of non-interference in Colombia's internal
affairs. Then along came "March 1" (a common way of
referring to the Colombian cross-border attack on FARC at
Angostura on that day in 2008). President Correa felt
betrayed by President Uribe, since they had spoken that day.
Since then there have been a number of attempts to arrange
reconciliation, by both the OAS and Carter Center. These
attempts have been useful in identifying commonalities, but
were unsuccessful.
3. (C) Now the issue is again heating up in the media.
President Correa condemns and is completely committed to
investigating any supposed links between Ecuadorian officials
and support to the FARC. The latest report of information
from another Raul Reyes diary -- if the diary is verified --
suggests serious linkages and problems.
4. (C) That said, Falconi stressed that there have been
substantial and positive discussions between the Colombian
and Ecuadorian governments, below the level of the
Presidencies. Falconi believes the relationship is ready to
enter a new stage, with "more optimistic relations." The
basic Ecuadorian requirements for re-establishing diplomatic
relations are known, and these can be discussed. Falconi
acknowledged that finalizing a reconciliation is difficult,
given media stories, or the propensity of Uribe, Foreign
Minister Bermudez or Correa to harsh words. Uribe and Correa
are "strong personalities."
5. (C) Falconi commented that they were harmed by the
breakdown of the &cartilla de seguridad8 (a mechanism by
which the GOE and the GOC communicated border security
alerts) since this considerably affected Ecuador,s security
on the border. He emphasized that they wanted a diplomatic
resolution of the situation and certainly did not want to get
involved in an &arms race.8 This was not their vision.
He knew that the two countries would have things they
disagreed on, but with a roadmap they could have a better
relationship that would provide greater trust and security.
He asked that the U.S. play a role in Ecuadorian-Colombian
rapprochement.
6. (C) As part two of the conversation, Falconi said he
wanted to ask about the issue of U.S. bases in Colombia,
which was causing worry in Ecuador. What would be the
purpose of the bases? Falconi said he wanted to hear
directly from the U.S. on this.
7. (C) The Ambassador concurred with Falconi that renewed
positive relations with Colombia were very important, and
asked after the status of efforts by the Carter Center.
Falconi said that the Carter Center had been helpful in
defining the common issues between Colombia and Ecuador, but
that reconciliation would not work if either Ecuador or
Colombia were forced into dialogue. Dialogue needs to be
built, and both countries were "constructing a process of
dialogue," something the U.S. government could assist with.
8. (C) The Ambassador noted that our involvement has only
been through the OAS, and asked if Falconi had something
specific in mind for a U.S. role. He did not. Turning to
the issue of the non-bases in Colombia, the Ambassador
pointed out that there was much exaggeration and unfounded
concerns reported in the press. First, there was no
agreement at the moment, just bilateral conversations with
the Colombians about access to Colombian bases. Any
agreement would regularize already existing activities and
practices. Of course this was related to our loss of access
to the Manta Forward Operating Location (FOL), and the need
to substitute coverage for the eastern Pacific.
Additionally, the U.S. has shared a defense vision with
Colombia for years, and the current discussions are looking
at deepening our cooperation on bilateral interests, which
are in Ecuador's interests as well.
9. (C) Falconi appeared to take the Ambassador's comments on
board, but added that both Chilean President Bachelet and
Brazilian President Lula had "expressed worry," as well as
Spanish FonMin Moratinos. The Ambassador pushed back, saying
that these were press reports and not necessarily accurate.
In the case of Moratinos, it was highly unlikely that the
Spanish, with actual U.S. bases on their soil, would be
saying anything so simplistic. The Ambassador repeated that
it was in Ecuador's interest that Colombia be able to fight
narcotrafficking effectively.
10. (C) Falconi paused, but agreed, and said the problem was
the need for official information from Washington. The
Ambassador agreed that information was good, but it was not
necessarily appropriate to share the details of our
conversations with the Colombians.
11. (C) Falconi then turned the meeting over the Under
Secretary Orbe for a status report on the Bilateral Dialogue.
Orbe summarized the proposed modification of the Dialogue,
to encompass "four pillars": Security, Cooperation and
Technical Assistance, Migratory Issues, and Trade and
Investment. He also reviewed the proposed timetable of
discussions, culminating in Washington on October 20. Orbe
noted that the GOE did not want this to be a once-a-year
event and hoped to engage with the U.S. in other ways
including maintaining a &strategic dialogue8 as &agreed by
the two presidents at the Trinidad Summit.8 (Note: On
several occasions both Falconi and Orbe have referred to an
alleged conversation between Correa and President Obama in
which they claim that the latter agreed to said dialogue.)
The Ambassador noted that there had not been enough time to
address the content of all the pillars. Nevertheless, in
some areas, for instance, ideas on the content of the
security pillar, there appeared to be agreement on both
sides. Since Orbe had mentioned discussion of Ecuador's
proposal for a Trade for Development Agreement, the
Ambassador cautioned that the Dialogue was not a negotiating
platform, and that the Administration did not even have trade
negotiating authority in general at this point.
12. (C) The Ambassador brought up the current status of our
agreements on cooperation with vetted units, stating that we
appeared to be very close to being able to conclude
agreements with DEA and DHS, which would also allow signing
of the NAS agreement. However, a pending written agreement
with another agency (to be discussed in septel) was looking
unlikely. She said that the U.S. would be proposing renewing
cooperation following an oral agreement. Falconi replied that
he would do a note relaying those points to Minister of
Government Jalkh, who led the GOE interagency group on this
issue.
13. (C) Comment: This meeting was the most professional we
have had with Falconi to date. He was careful and moderate
with his language, and not particularly partisan. It is the
first time we have heard him allow for a Correa fault, in his
description of Correa's "strong personality" causing problems
for the diplomatic negotiations with Colombia. On the issue
of Colombia and U.S. military presence, the GOE appears
genuinely worried, and this may have prompted Falconi's
suggestion that the U.S. take a role in Colombia-Ecuador
reconciliation, seeking to divert us from a more unilateral
engagement with the Colombians. We feel it would be
extremely useful to be responsive to Falconi,s request for
more, and preferably written, information on the DCA
discussions.
HODGES
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