Se hace referencia a los principales integrantes de la UIES, la unidad
responsable de la mayoría de golpes al narcotráfico, como los “chicos
buenos”, quienes estaban siendo investigados por devolver las
computadoras que había donado EE.UU. La cabeza visible del grupo era el
mayor Manuel Silva, ahora en servicio pasivo.
id:
200475
date:
4/2/2009 22:27
refid:
09QUITO233
origin:
Embassy Quito
classification:
CONFIDENTIAL
destination:
09QUITO103|09QUITO153|09QUITO177|09QUITO227
header:
VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB
DE RUEHQT #0233/01 0922227
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 022227Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY QUITO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0227
INFO RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 8080
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 4135
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 3488
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ APR LIMA 3139
RUEHGL/AMCONSUL GUAYAQUIL 4240
RUEABND/DEA HQS WASHDC
RHEFHLC/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
----------------- header ends ----------------
C O N F I D E N T I A L QUITO 000233
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: TWENTY YEARS
TAGS: SNAR, PTER, PREL, PGOV, KCRM, EC, CO
SUBJECT: POLICE UNIT INVESTIGATED WHILE CHAUVIN CASE INCHES
FORWARD
REF: A. QUITO 227
B. QUITO 177
C. QUITO 153
D. QUITO 103
Classified By: Ambassador Heather M. Hodges for Reasons 1.4 (b&d)
1. (C) SUMMARY: Ecuador's "narco-politics" scandal is
playing out in perverse ways. The good guys ) key personnel
of a specialized police unit that was responsible for most of
the GOE's success against narco-traffickers ) are under
investigation by the GOE for returning USG computers and fear
FARC reprisals. Government Minister Jalkh has taken a few
steps to restore the integrity of the unit, but its future
effectiveness remains highly in doubt. Meanwhile, the case
against one of the bad guys ) former Under Secretary
Chauvin, whose ties to FARC narco-trafficking were uncovered
by the police unit ) is at least inching forward due to the
courage of the prosecutor. But President Correa is
threatening reprisals against the prosecutor and intends to
bring another bad guy, Chauvin ally and former minister
Gustavo Larrea, back into the cabinet. END SUMMARY.
GOVERNMENT MINISTER INTERVENES IN ADMINISTRATION OF SPECIAL
POLICE UNIT
2. (C) After two very bad months, the Special Police
Investigative Unit (UIES), formerly supported by the USG,
experienced a mixed bag of changes over the past two weeks.
This is the unit that uncovered former Government Under
Secretary Ignacio Chauvin's alleged ties to narcotraffickers
(Ref C) and carried out many other operations critical to the
success of Ecuador's fight against narcoterrorism. However,
the UIES lost its leadership and key personnel on February 4
when Police Commander Jaime Hurtado transferred them out of
the unit (Ref D), replacing the unit chief with Major Rafael
Perez. Due to his failure to pass a polygraph test and the
GOE's refusal to vet Perez and other personnel for the elite
unit, the USG was forced to end its support, which the press
reports amounted to approximately $2 million annually and
essentially financed its operations.
3. (C) One positive development was Minister of Government
and Police Gustavo Jalkh's request on March 25 that Police
Commander Hurtado remove Perez as UIES Chief because he did
not have the "profile appropriate to manage a special police
unit," explaining that it should be led by an officer with
the rank of at least colonel. Two days later, Hurtado
announced that the unit would be led by Colonel Juan Carlos
Rueda, who was trained in tactics under the Group of
Intervention and Rescue, served as the Chief of the Judicial
Police of Guayas province, and most recently worked in the
Commission of Police Reforms. Rueda is someone we think we
may be able to work with.
4. (C) In another constructive move, Minister Jalkh on March
24 criticized transfers ordered by Hurtado in early February
and requested that all transfers be suspended for 60 days,
saying that "constant transfers of police personnel have
provoked a lack of continuity in the work they perform, which
has had an effect on the efficiency of their work."
5. (C) On the negative side of the ledger, however, Minister
Jalkh announced plans for the unit to report directly to the
General Directorate of Intelligence (which will report to the
Presidency). The impact of other decisions is less clear:
Jalkh said the unit would be funded by national resources and
"countries that want to support the work of this group
against organized crime," and include the use of Ecuadorian
polygraph testing in the recruitment of personnel. Hurtado
decided to change the name of the unit to the Fight Against
Organized Crime Unit.
FORMER UIES CHIEF SUBJECT TO INVESTIGATION AND THREATS
6. (C) Major Manuel Silva, who had served as the UIES Chief
until February 4, responded on March 24 to accusations of
improper conduct, specifically regarding the controversial
"handover of sensitive information" to the U.S. Embassy upon
the unit's return of Embassy-donated computers and equipment.
He stated that Police Commander Hurtado had authorized the
return of all the equipment. (Note. The information
contained in the computers has been jointly shared and
collaborated upon between the unit and the Embassy for
several years. End Note.)
7. (C) Major Silva filed a formal complaint on March 24 with
the Prosecutor General's office, urging it to investigate the
alleged burning of critical documents in the UIES unit
ordered by Major Perez. According to Silva, Perez ordered
the burning of the documents with the intent of alleging
their "disappearance" in order to implicate Silva further.
8. (SBU) In early February, the newly appointed UIES chief
Major Perez had accused former UIES chief Major Silva and
three other former UIES officials with the rank of captain of
delivering the computers to the U.S. Embassy. Following
review and a decision by a Council of Generals, the case
against Silva and the three captains was handed to the
Ministry of Government and Police on February 16. Based on a
subsequent report from Minister Jalkh and Minister of
Internal and External Security Miguel Carvajal, a prosecutor
of the Miscellaneous Crimes Unit opened a case on March 18 to
investigate Silva and the UIES unit. Meanwhile, the
Legislative Commission accepted a request by the Popular
Democratic Movement to conduct its own investigation of the
UIES unit.
9. (C) Attorneys for the captains have complained that the
investigation has violated their defendants' rights and that
the review process by the Council of Generals was unjust and
did not allow for an appeal and was not transparent. Family
and friends of Major Perez protested in front of the
Ecuadorian National Police headquarters on March 31 demanding
that the case against Silva be transparent and fair.
10. (C) As a consequence of the very public nature of the
transfer and investigation of former UIES chief Silva and
others in the unit, including the daily appearance of Silva's
name and photo in the press, Silva and the others have had
their personal security put at risk as potential FARC
targets. Silva is currently in hiding and has been promised
security by the GOE, but his family reportedly has not yet
been contacted to coordinate this protection.
WHO HAS THE CASE?
11. (C) Guayas province Prosecutor Antonio Gagliardo decided
March 24 to allow cases to proceed against Chauvin and 25
others implicated in the UIES's Border Hurricane operation
against narcotraffickers. This allowed the cases to advance
to the next stage in the judicial process, namely a court
hearing. Gagliardo held back three cases for further review.
Counternarcotics Prosecutor Jorge Solorzano had filed
charges against all 29 on March 9.
12. (C) Attempts to change the judge and jurisdiction in the
Chauvin case failed. A Guayas province judge had earlier
reviewed a complaint filed by one of the defendants regarding
the jurisdiction of the case and announced that the original
judge Zoila Alvarado would no longer hear the case, and that
it would be transferred to Esmeraldas. However, the Guayas
district court returned the case to Judge Alvarado on March
13, so she still has jurisdiction, at least for now.
IS LARREA COMING BACK?
13. (C) A Political Control and Oversight Committee of the
interim Legislative Commission, responding to a call by Julio
Logrono of former president Lucio Gutierrez' Patriotic
Society Party (PSP), decided to carry out an investigation
into former minister Gustavo Larrea's authorization of or
consent to Ignacio Chauvin's seven admitted meetings with the
FARC. The committee began its ten day review on March 31.
The investigation will stretch well past the April 26
elections.
14. (C) Defending Larrea, President Correa announced during
his March 14 weekly radio/TV address that he would request
that the Prosecutor General investigate Prosecutor Solorzano,
"because what he has done is just a show. As a result, what
they have done is accuse Chauvin of being an accomplice, as
well as Gustavo (Larrea), but haven't found anything."
Correa then added that he intended to reintegrate former
Security Minister Larrea back into his cabinet. To date,
however, he has not appointed Larrea to any cabinet position.
15. (C) Responding to statements by PSP and the Commission
questioning Larrea's ties to the FARC, Larrea held a press
conference on March 26. He stressed that the Correa
government's efforts in the northern border region were
unprecedented and that there was a campaign to link the GOE
to the FARC. He refuted any allegations of his own ties to
the FARC. Larrea accused expelled diplomat Mark Sullivan of
being the point-man of a structured USG system of
intelligence for the region and the CIA of participating in a
plot against the Correa government.
16. (C) Larrea's appointment (if it happened) would be his
third rise to Correa's cabinet, having served first as
Minister of Government and Police and then as Coordinating
Minister of Internal and External Security. However,
Correa's recent comments in defense of Larrea are likely just
an attempt to persuade voters that the GOE is clean and to
appease Larrea supporters.
COMMENT
17. (C) Despite a couple of steps forward, effective
prosecution and sentencing of those accused of
narcotrafficking as a result of the UIES's Border Hurricane
operation will likely be stymied by Ecuador's ineffective
legal system. Meanwhile, the ability of Ecuador's police to
combat and investigate other narcotrafficking cases is
suffering, at least in the short term. For example, due to a
lack of training and experience, Ecuadorian polygraphing will
not likely be carried out in an effective or reliable manner.
Even more problematic is the fact that the UIES and other
special investigation units will now be managed by political
appointees in the General Directorate of Intelligence. In an
environment of slow-moving investigations and increasing
political control, the door is open for the Correa government
to shape the outcomes and divert public attention away from
any suggestion of GOE narco ties.
HODGES
=======================CABLE ENDS============================
